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Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Commissioners
of Inland Revenue: Eliminating a Harmful
Tax Practice or Encouraging
Multinationals to Shop Around the Bloc?
I. INTRODUCTION

Cadbury Schweppes, the successful international beverages
and confectionery group, is undoubtedly celebrating a sweet
victory in its newly launched campaign. This campaign, however,
does not involve the introduction of new seasonal chocolate treats.
Rather, Cadbury is challenging the tax laws of the United
Kingdom (UK). Current UK legislation penalizes multinational
companies who exploit the different rates of business tax charged
across the European Union (EU).' Cadbury's campaign argues
that these tax laws are contrary to European Community (EC)
law-specifically, the freedom of establishment.2
On September 12, 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
delivered a broadside against the UK tax system. The ECJ
declared in Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue that any legislation that levies taxes against Controlled
Foreign Companies (CFC) that pursue genuine economic activities
1. David Prosser, EU Tax Row is a Bitter Pill for Politicians, INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 23, 2005, http:llwww.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4l58/is-20050423/
ai_n14599205; see also Ulrika Lomas, European Governments Preparefor Assault on Tax
Base, TAX-NEWS, Dec. 13,. 2005, http:/lwww.tax-news.com/asp/story/story-open.asp?

storyname=22054.
2. "The freedom of establishment grants to Community nationals the right for
companies formed in accordance with the law of a Member State to exercise
their activity in the Member State concerned through, inter alia, a subsidiary.
Freedom of establishment thus seeks to guarantee the benefit of national
treatment in the host Member State of the subsidiary, by prohibiting any
discrimination, even minimal, based on the place in which companies have their
seat."
Rosemary Strevinioti, Freedom of Establishmentfor Companies, EUR. BUS. GUIDE, May
1, 2007, http://www.businessupdated.com/shownews.asp?newsid=2031&cat=Freedom+
of+establishment+for+companies.
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outside the member state is contrary to EC law. In this case, the
ECJ determined that UK CFC laws may have potentially gone
beyond what was necessary to counteract tax avoidance schemes.!
Generally, businesses stand to benefit by declaring their
profits in the EU member state that charges the lowest corporate
tax rate.5 For example, in Ireland the tax rate is just ten percent,
nearly a third of the level charged in the UK.6 But under UK tax
laws, the subsidiary CFC's income would be taxed at the UK's
higher rate.7 UK CFC legislation is determined to prevent
multinationals from channeling their profits through subsidiaries in
other EU countries with lower tax rates.'
-Nevertheless, the ECJ ruled that the UK may only enforce
the CFC rules against those companies who have created "wholly
artificial" arrangements in order to enjoy lower corporate tax rates
abroad More important, the ECJ's decision stressed that if a
company establishes itself in a member state to avail itself of lower
taxes, that does not constitute abuse in and of itself."
This Note will argue that although the ECJ's ruling was fair,
its proposed legal standard of "wholly artificial arrangement" is far
too unclear to provide adequate guidance for future cases. In order
for this ruling to be effective, the ECJ must provide additional
direction. What constitutes permissible control of a company for
tax relief purposes? What constitutes an illegal tax residence? Any
proposed standard of review must take into account the way
multinational corporations are structured and conduct business
today. This is especially true in the electronic era of e-commerce
and dot-com companies that do business without storefronts or
inventory. Absent a meaningful remedy, the result could be a race

3. See Inst. of Chartered Accountants in Eng. & Wales [ICAEW], Cadbury
Schweppes and the .UK CFC rules - The ECJ Judgment, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfrn?route=142022.
4. See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006
E.C.R. 1-7995.
5. Prosser, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Stephen Castle, Landmark Tax Ruling Could Lead to Changes in UK Law,
INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 13, 2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/business/news/
article1523202.ece.
10. See Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 1 37 (citing Case C-212/97, Centros
Ltd. v. Selskabbstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 1 27; Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, 2003
E.C.R. 1-10155, $I96).
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by multinationals to create illegal subsidiaries in favorable tax
regimes-contrary to the Community's goal of eliminating
national barriers to the free movement of goods, people, services,
and capital."
Part II sets out the factual background to the issues raised in
Cadbury. Part III summarizes the relevant law. Part IV examines
the ECJ's analysis of the CFC legislation issue in greater detail and
discusses the incomplete remedy. Part V concludes that the UK is
not likely to give in without an additional fight because the ECJ
decision could lead to a significant loss in tax revenue.
II. BACKGROUND
Cadbury Schweppes plc (Cadbury), a UK resident company,
is the parent corporation of a global group of companies operating
in the drinks and confectionery sector.'2 Among its companies are
two subsidiaries established in the International Financial Services
Centre (IFSC) of Dublin, Ireland.'3 The dispute in Cadbury arises
from the UK tax authority's attempt to tax Cadbury based on
profits generated by one of its Ireland-based subsidiaries."
According to Cadbury, its Irish subsidiaries were established
to raise funds and generally provide financial capital to the
Cadbury group. 5 Its profits were subject to a tax rate of ten
percent, one-third the actual'rate in the UK.'6 However, UK tax
authorities claimed a corporation tax from Cadbury on one of the

11. See Mark Watson, Developments in European Union Cross Border Tax Planning1
(PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Guernsey,
2006),
http://www.pwc.com/Extweb/
ncpressrelease.nsftdocid/4CC83D7C1B284268025722600371F20/$file/pwc -developments
_inEUcrossborder_tax.pdf (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International &
Comparative Law Review).
12. Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Communities, United Kingdom
Legislation on Controlled Foreign Companies Can Apply Only to Wholly Artificial Tax
Arrangements (Sept. 12,
2006), available at http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/
actu/communiques/cpO6/aff/cpO60072en.pdf. The "Cadbury group" is composed of
subsidiaries established in the United Kingdom, EU member states, and other countries.
Opinion of Advocate Gen. Lger, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of
Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 20.
13. Opinion of Advocate Gen. Iger 20.
14. Id. J 19. "UK tax authorities" refers to HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC]. UK
Controlled Foreign Company Rules Can Apply Only to Wholly Artificial Arrangements 1
(Latham & Watkins, LLP, Client Report No. 543, 2006) [hereinafter Latham & Watkins
Client Report], available at http://lw.com/upload/pubContentLpdf/pub1657-l.pdf.
15. Opinion of Advocate Gen. L6ger 22.
16. Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 14; Prosser, supra note 1.
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Irish subsidiary's profits for the 2006
financial year because it
''7
enjoyed "a lower level of taxation. 1
In response to the UK's tax claim on Cadbury's foreign
profits, Cadbury appealed the decision before the EU Special
Commissioners, the appellate body of the tax administration."8
Cadbury argued that the CFC legislation was contrary to
established EC law: particularly, the rights to freedom of
establishment, freedom to provide services, and free movement of
capital."
III. RELEVANT LAW

A. Relevant EuropeanLaw
Determining the legality of the UK CFC legislation under EC
law requires an examination of the principles reflected in the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty). 20 The
EC Treaty is an expression of the EU's desire to create a unique
"common market, 21 by progressively abolishing harmful practices
22
that restrict international trade.
The EC Treaty's objective to create a common market calls
for the protection of certain "fundamental freedoms," including
the freedom of establishment (Article 43) and the freedom to
provide cross border services (Article 49).23 These freedoms are
central to the effective functioning of a common market, and in
particular, to the tax dispute between Cadbury and the UK.
Freedom of establishment "enables an economic operator
(whether a person or a company) to carry on an economic activity
24
in a stable and continuous way in one or more Member States.
17. Opinion of Advocate Gen. L6ger J 25 (noting additionally that the other
subsidiary suffered a loss that year).
18. Id. 26.
19. Id.
20. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
21. Marilyn J. Raisch, European Union Law: An Integrated Guide to Electronic and
Print Research,May 29, 2007, http://www.llrx.com/features/eulaw2.htm.
22. Dutchtax.net, Discussion Cadbury-Schweppes Case, http://www.dutchtax.net/
Dutch/Memos/Cadbury-Schweppes.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Discussion
Cadbury-Schweppes Case].
23. European Commission [EC], General Principles: Freedom to Provide Services /
Freedom of Establishment, http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/services/principles-en.htm"
(last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
24. Id.
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"[F]reedom to provide [cross-border] services enables an
economic operator providing services in one Member State to
offer services on a temporary basis in another Member State,
without having to be established."'
These two principles have a direct effect on the national law
of the member states and will preempt any conflicting national law
provisions.26 As such, member states must modify any national laws
that restrict either the freedom of establishment or the freedom to
provide services." Furthermore, any national rules that hinder or
render less attractive the exercise of these fundamental freedoms
(i.e., if they result in delays or additional costs) may only be
maintained if they are justified by overriding principles of general
interest.8
The EU Economic Community, a union comprised of twentyseven independent states, represents an important trans-national
market for companies.29 While planning investment strategies,
companies need to keep abreast of any developments in each of
the various member states' tax regimes, ensuring that shareholder
value is maximized 0
Meanwhile, the EU has stated that its role is only
supplementary to the national tax systems currently in place within
each member state.3 According to the EU, "its aim is not to
standardize the national systems of compulsory taxes and
contributions, but simply to ensure that they are compatible not
only with each other, but also with the aims of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community."3
B. Relevant United Kingdom Law
The United Kingdom, along with several other EU member
states, enacted legislation aimed at CFCs in an attempt to thwart

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (noting the examples of public policy, public security, and public health).
29. See Watson, supra note 11, at 1.
30. See id.
31. See id.; see also Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 8. The only time the
profits of a CFC will not be subject to the UK tax scheme is if: (1) ninety percent of its
profits are attributed to the resident company and thus already subject to UK taxes; (2) it
is engaged in "exempt activities"; (3) it satisfies the "public quotation condition"; or (4) its
chargeable profits do not exceed £50,000. Id.
32. See Watson, supra note 11, at 1.
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evasive tax practices." A CFC is a company in which fifty percent
or more of its holdings are owned by a UK resident company.' UK
tax legislation provides that a resident company is subject to a
corporation tax on its worldwide profits,3" including the profits of
its CFCs.'
CFC legislation taxes the UK parent company for foreign
profits when its subsidiaries are residents of a "lower tax"
jurisdiction." A jurisdiction is considered a "lower tax" jurisdiction
if its tax rate is less than seventy-five percent of the UK's tax rate."
The CFC rules target companies that avoid the UK tax by
diverting pre-tax income to subsidiaries located in tax havens and
preferential tax regimes." Companies engaging in this practice
incur a "penalty tax" that amounts to the difference between the
UK tax rate and the lower tax regime rate.'
C. Ruling
The ECJ decision in Cadbury follows the Special
Commissioner's stay of the proceedings and referral of the matter
to the ECJ for determination under EU law." The question
submitted to the ECJ asked whether current UK CFC tax
legislation was a restriction on the freedoms expounded in the EC
Treaty. '2
The ECJ determined that the UK CFC rules potentially
represented a restriction on the freedom of establishment." The
UK's practice of offsetting the advantages that a Community
national received in a more favorable tax jurisdiction was held to
be unjustified." If the subsidiary was a genuine operation, the
objective of the EC Treaty and the purpose of the freedom of
establishment were being undermined. 5

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Discussion Cadbury-Schweppes Case, supra note 22.
Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 6.
Id. T 3.
Id. 15.
Id. 16.
Id. 17.
See id.
9-11.
See id 6.
Id. 1 28.
Id.
Watson, supra note 11, at 2.
Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, 75.
See id. 49.
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While the ECJ recognized the UK's right to protect its tax
base from artificial cross-border transactions, '
it also
acknowledged that Community nationals have a right to establish
themselves in the member state of their choice. 7 According to the
ECJ, the goal to prevent losses in tax revenue is not a valid reason
to override the general interest that would justify maintaining the
CFC legislation."
In reaching this determination, the ECJ examined the UK
CFC rules, specifically the "motive test."49 The court concluded
that the motive test would be compliant with EU law if its only
effect was "to tax companies that had not been set up for genuine
commercial reasons.""0 Furthermore, the ECJ clearly stated that
establishing a CFC in a country with a low tax rate is not an
abusive practice per se and should be permitted if the CFC were
run as a genuine operation."
IV. ARGUMENT

A. The ECJ's Dissatisfaction with the "Motive Test"
Generally, the UK CFC rules apply where the subsidiary is a
resident outside the UK and is subject to a "lower level of
taxation."52 There are five instances where the CFC rules will not
be applied. 3 The ECJ only examined the fifth instance, which
looks at the particular motives of the company in establishing an
overseas subsidiary. This is known as the "motive test."' '
The motive test is couched in the negative. Thus, a company
generally satisfies the motive test and the CFC rules do not apply
unless it is found that: (1) the main purpose of the transactions
46. See id. 1 51, 59.
47. Id. 53.
48. "[I]n order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be justified
on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of such a
restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial
arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the
tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national
territory."
Id. 55. The restriction must be "proportionate in relation to that objective." Id. 57.
49. See discussion infra Part IV.A; see also Watson, supra note 11, at 2.
50. Watson, supra note 11, at 2.
51. See Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, IT 36-37.
52. Id.
5-7.
53. Id. 18.
54. Id. 9.
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which gave rise to the profits of the CFC was to achieve a tax
reduction, and (2) the main reason for the CFC's existence was to
achieve a tax reduction." The burden is on the resident company
to show that the main purpose of its CFC's transactions and
6
existence was not to avoid UK taxes.
Cadbury argued that the motive test was a broad, nonobjective test under which genuine economic activities will
inevitably be caught. 7 In particular, the motive test does not
require the UK tax authorities to perform any sort of analysis into
the actual activities of the overseas company in order to determine
whether it has been genuinely established.58 The ECJ found this
argument compelling and pointed out that a corporation's decision
to set up an offshore subsidiary in a country with a more favorable
tax regime does not automatically carry with it the general
presumption of "tax evasion." 9
B. The ECJ's Solution
The central question posed by the ECJ to determine whether
CFC legislation would pass Community law muster was whether
the legislation affected only artificial arrangements.' According to
the ECJ, CFC legislation may only be justified on the ground of
preventing abusive tax evasion practices if the specific objective of
the restriction is to prevent conduct. involving the creation of
"wholly artificial arrangements."6 ' The ECJ opinion does not make
clear what is meant by this "wholly artificial arrangements"
standard.
The Advocate General, however, suggests that determining
whether a wholly artificial arrangement exists requires a "case-bycase examination of whether the subsidiary is genuinely
' Three objective factors appear to
established in the host State."62
be relevant to determining whether a wholly artificial arrangement
exists: (1) the degree of physical presence of the subsidiary in the
55. Id. IT 9-11.
56. Id. IT 10-11.
57. See id. [T 63-64.
58. See id.
64-69; see also Opinion of Advocate Gen' lger IT 147-49 (debating
proper interpretation of the motive test).
59. Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, $J 50, 69 (citing Opinion of Advocate
Gen. lager 103).
60. Id. 1 57.
61. Id. 1 55; see also Opinion of Advocate Gen. lager 108.
62. Opinion of Advocate Gen. lager 110.
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host state; (2) the genuine nature of the activity provided by the
subsidiary; and (3) the economic value of that activity with regard
to the parent company and the entire group." The burden is on
member states to prove that their legislation applies only to
artificial arrangements and not to genuine enterprises.'
1. Applying the "Wholly Artificial Arrangements" Test
It is evidently clear that the ECJ does not support the
improper circumvention of national tax legislation. In order to
enjoy the tax advantage of another member state, there must be a
real offshore operation, with indication that people who possess
the skill and the authority to make decisions are running the daily
business in the declared territory.' Alternatively, flying in once a
month from London Heathrow Airport, taking a quick cab ride
into town to sign papers (written in the UK prior to leaving and
emailed for signature upon arrival), and then taking a cab back to
the airport only to be absent from the London parent company's
office for five hours would not amount to sufficient offshore
management.' Such an arrangement would clearly constitute a
wholly artificial arrangement.
The proffered example was an easy case, but what of the
outliers? For example, is an offshore operation of twenty persons
who book profits via the running of an offshore bank account a
legitimate business? The inherent problems in proving the
legitimacy of companies running such operations may 6 7 be
"insurmountable," leading to inevitable changes in UK tax law.
The purpose of freedom of establishment is "to allow a
Community national to participate, on a stable and continuing

63. Id. 111. Daniel Friel, a London Tax Partner for Latham & Watkins, offers the
following commentary:
The Judgment follows the opinion of the Advocate General and gives plenty of
scope of uncertainty. It is not clear whether the so-called "motive test" in the
UK's CFC legislation satisfies the tests laid down by the ECJ. The motive test,
which gives an exemption from the application of the CFC rules, is very tightly
drawn and many "commercial" arrangements could fail that test.
Latham & Watkins Client Report, supra note 14, at 2.
64. Latham & Watkins Client Report, supra note 14, at 2.
65. Richard
Murphy,
Cadbury
Schweppes
An
Analysis,
http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2006/09/13/Cadbury-Schweppes-an-analysis/ (Sept. 13,
2006,11:28).
66. Id.
67. Castle, supra note 9.
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basis, in the economic life of [another] Member State ....

"6

As

applied to Cadbury, if the motive test could catch Cadbury's
subsidiary, regardless of whether it was a genuine operation, the
CFC legislation would be considered contrary to Community law.69
Although there is some indication that the ECJ found the
motive test to be over-inclusive," the ECJ simply referred the
matter back to the UK courts to determine whether they could
interpret the subjectively-worded motive test in an objective
71
manner.
2. Deficiencies in the "Wholly Artificial Arrangements" Test
The Advocate General indicated that CFC legislation cannot
be based purely on irrelevant subjective criteria.72 Unfortunately,
the ECJ's guidance on what constitutes a wholly artificial
arrangement refers simply to the "extent to which the CFC
physically exists" in the declared offshore territory. 3 The objective
factors outlined in the ECJ standard only take into consideration
the premises, staff, and equipment at the foreign locality.
It seems apparent, therefore, that a local corporation found to
have substantial physical contacts in the host member state may
benefit from the beneficial tax regime of that locality. In the age of
electronic commerce, however, physical presence and local
manpower are not necessarily good indicators of whether a
business carries on genuine economic activities. Over the past
fifteen years alone, there has been a major paradigm shift in the
way business is done.75 Telecommuting and flexible workspaces
have allowed offices in different locations to link to one another
through a common network 6 In addition, economic societies have
become so electronically advanced that tasks which previously
required ten people to complete five years ago can easily be

68. Cadbury Schweppes, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995, T 53 (citing Case C-55/94, Gebhard, 1995
E.C.R. 1-4165, 25).
69. See id. 72.
70. See id. 69.
71. Latham & Watkins Client Report, supra note 14, at 2.
72. See Opinion of Advocate Gen. lUger T 116.
73. Latham & Watkins Client Report, supra note 14, at 2.
74. See id.
75. Studyworld.com, Technological Advances and Their Impact on Business,
http://www.studyworld.com/newsite/ReportEssay/Science/Technical%5CTechnological-A
dvances-and TheirImpactOnBusiness-323483.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
76. Id.
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accomplished by one person today provided that person is assisted
by the right technology. It is unclear how modern technological
advancements fit within the ECJ's idea of a wholly artificial
arrangement, if at all.
While the ECJ touts the need for objective criteria, it is
unclear what constitutes a wholly artificial arrangement." Though
the addition of objective factors is fair and mildly helpful, it is still
very difficult to determine which types of activities constitute
wholly artificial arrangements." It is therefore disconcerting that
the ECJ has left to the UK domestic courts the determination of
whether the UK motive test targets only wholly artificial
arrangements intended to escape the normally mandatory national
tax. Continued litigation will likely be necessary before the
domestic national courts will be able to make this determination."
V. CONCLUSION

In closing, the chocolate makers may have won a small battle,
but they have a long war ahead of them.°,The ECJ "stopped short
of declaring the CFC rules illegal," 8' making clear that it did not
regard the UK rules as breaking the EC Treaty per se. Ultimately,
investors in EU member states are free to choose how to structure
their economic activities.'
Furthermore, while the ECJ ruling is consistent with the
pronouncements set forth in the EC Treaty, it may have an
undesired effect of promoting harmful trade practices and tax
evasion schemes. Businesses may opt for the lowest overall tax
burden, as the ECJ confirmed that benefiting from a favorable tax

77. Latham & Watkins Client Report, supra note 14, at 2.
78.

ECJ Decision - Cadbury Schweppes - UK CFC Rules (C-196/04) 2 (Ernst &

Young, Alert No. 52, 2006) [hereinafter Ernst & Young Alert], available at
http://www.ey.com/GlobaUlAssets.nsf/Luxembourg-E/EU-competency-alert-52-sept-06/$
file/EY EU TAXAlert52_Sep2006.pdf.
79. Id.
80. Nicholas Neveling, Cadbury Case Just One Small Battle in Long Hard Struggle,
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Sept. 21, 2006, http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/
analysis/2164747/cadbury-case-small-battle-long.
81. Multinationals Set to Benefit from New ECJ Tax Ruling, NEWSLETrER (George

Theocharides Law Office, Cyprus), Dec. 2006, http://www.theocharides.com/
newsletterdec2006.htm.
82. Frank Muntendam, The End of CFC Legislation in Europe? (Ernst & Young,
Lux., 2006), http://www.ey.com/globalContent.nsflLuxembourgE/Question%3A The_
end ofCFClegislation in-Europe.
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regime is not, in and of itself, an abuse of the freedom of
establishment.83
Following Cadbury, many UK resident companies may now
race to establish subsidiaries in overseas tax havens, where
previously they would have been subject to the higher UK tax rate.
Such a loss of tax revenue could have a huge impact in the UK.
One source indicates that "[t]he initial impact of this case is
estimated to be over £8 million in lost revenue" from Cadbury
alone.' It is further estimated that the decision could lead to the
loss of many hundreds of millions of pounds in future tax
revenue. 85
In response to the ECJ judgment, the UK Treasury issued a
statement saying it "welcomed the fact that the ECJ has endorsed
the appropriateness of rules to counter tax avoidance through
artificial profit shifting,"' choosing to focus on the ECJ's approval
of tax restrictions aimed at wholly artificial arrangements. As
noted by one commentator, however, this is "[h]ardly the talk of a
defeated opponent. '
Several media outlets closely following Cadbury have
weighed in on the ECJ's decision. Some predict that because the
ruling threatens the UK tax revenue base, the EC will pursue
alternative remedies.' One theory is that, with the potential loss of
tax revenue from CFC profits, the Commission will aggressively
push through its proposal for an "EU-wide common tax base." 9
In summary, profits generated by the genuine economic
activity of a lower-taxed CFC based offshore cannot be included in

83. Ernst & Young Alert, supra note 78, at 1.
84. Osborneclarke.com,
Cadbury
Schweppes
Case
Review,
http://www.osborneclarke.com/publications/tax/Cadbury%20Schweppes/7159.asp
(last
visited Sept. 9, 2008).
85. Id.
86. Neveling, supra note 80. The UK Treasury is responsible for formulating and
implementing the UK Government's financial and economic policy. About HM Treasury,
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/about/about-index.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
87. Neveling, supra note 80.
88. See David Smyth, Cadbury Schweppes Case - A Win for Taxpayers? 2 (Ernst &
Young, Ir., 2006), http://www.ey.com/GlobalUAssets.nsf/Ireland/Cadbury-SchweppesCase -_a_Win-forjTaxpayers/$file/Cadbury%20Schweppes%20Case%20-%20a%20
Win%20for%20Taxpayers.pdf (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International &
Comparative Law Review); see also Cadbury Schweppes Case Review, supra note 84.
89. Ahmed ElAmin, Cadbury's Tax Win Signals Opportunity for Multinationals,
CONFECTIONARY NEWS, Sept. 14, 2006, http://www.confectionerynews.comlnews/ng.asp?
n=70580-cadbury-tax-multinational.

2008]

Cadbury v. Commissionersof Inland Revenue

89

the national tax base of its parent company.? An analysis of
objective factors is used to determine whether certain cross-border
activities are genuine economic activities or wholly artificial
arrangements.' Unfortunately, given the nature of modern
business, it is currently unclear where the fine line exists between
an acceptable standard of practice and an abuse of the tax
structure.9'
Phuong (Lily) Tran*

90. See Ernst & Young Alert, supra note 78, at 2.
91. See id.
92. See Watson, supranote 11, at 3.
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Alisa
Manasantivongs and Peter Jordan for their insightful comments on drafts of this note. I
would also like to thank my fellow editors on the board for selecting this note for
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